Dan Siegel v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Dan Siegel v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood
Sanitary District : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Fred L. Finlinson; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Siegel v. Salt Lake County, No. 17181 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2402
' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAN SIEGEL, 
---00000---
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTONWOOD 
SANITARY DISTRICT, 
) ' 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent;) 
BRIEF ,OF 
Fred L. Finlinson 
FINLINSON & FINLINSON 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Events Before Filing of Complaint. 
B. Procedural Facts 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I The Trial Court Improperly Reduced the 
Condemnation Award by the Amount of 
Benefit to Siegel's Remaining Property 
Attributed by the Court to the Presence 
1 
1 
2 
4 
6 
of the Sewer . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Point II - The Court Erred in Failing to Award 
Interest from November 19, 1976, the 
Date the District Took Actual Possession 
of the Property. . . . . . . . . 9 
Point III - An Award of Damages for Wrongful Entry 
and Occupation is Appropriate. 10 
CONCLUSION . . 11 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Automotive Production Corp. v. Provo City, 502 P.2d 
568, 28 Ut.2d 358 (1972). . 8 
City of Baldwin Park v. Stockus, 503 P.2d 1033, 
105 Cal.Rptr. 325 (1972). . . . . . . . . 9 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-34-10, 1953, as amended 7 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-34-9, 1953, as amended. 9 
ii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
DAN SIEGEL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTONWOOD 
SANITARY DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
Case No. 17181 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Respondent Sewer District ("District") installed 
a sewer line across land owned by Plaintiff-Appellant ("Siegel") 
while negotiations with Siegel for an easement were in progress 
but without first obtaining an easement or an order of occupancy 
and without notice to Siegel. 
Siegel commenced this action to compel the District to 
remove its line and for trespass damages. The proceedings was 
converted to a condemnation action by the District's Answer. 
The case proceeded to trial on the issues of just compensation 
and damages only. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
After non-jury trial, the Court decreed that the District 
had acquired an easement by condemnation in a strip of land 
ten (10) feet on each side of the sewer's center line, awarded 
Siegel no damages for trespass, and awarded Siegel compensation 
for the take using a formula which Siegel contends to violate 
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Utah's eminent domain statutes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Events Before Filing of Complaint. 
During a period of about four days beginning on November 19. 
1976, the District installed a sewer line across an approximate0 
17-acre parcel of Siegel's land (the "Tract") located near 10~ 
East and 70th South in Salt Lake County (R-106, Testimony of 
Roscoe Godfrey, the District's manager). The Tract and approx-
imate route of the sewer line are delineated on Exhibit P-1. 
The District had not, at the time of sewer installation, obta~~ 
a grant of easement from Siegel, and it had not obtained or 
even made application for an order of occupancy (R-107, Godfrey 
testimony) . 
Not only did the District enter the Tract without notice 
to Siegel, its manager failed to mention the entry during a 
telephone conversation with Siegel on the day it occurred. On 
that very day, Godfrey had a telephone conversation with Siegel 
during which the terms of a possible easement were discussed 
(R-144, Godfrey testimony). During his testimony at trial, 
Godfrey was asked to recall all that was said in that conversat~ 
He was certainly then aware of Siegel's complaint that the District': 
entry was surreptitious. According to his testimony, he did not 
tell Siegel during the November 19 conversation that, while theY 
were conversing, the District was already occupying the Tract 
and laying the sewer line across it. The record reveals ~ 
notice to Siegel, written or oral. Siegel learned of the 
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installation months later from a resident of the Tract's 
neighborhood (R-38,39; 97,98). He then wrote the District 
and asked for confirmation (Exhibit P-5). 
The District has claimed some kind of oral permission 
to make the sewer installation across the Tract. Obviously, 
an oral permission would not justify the District's occupation, 
and the District was aware that it would not (R-20). Without 
regard to statute of fraud issues, however, it is clear from 
the evidence that the District had not, when it laid the sewer 
through the Tract, satisfied the conditions upon which Siegel 
had expressed willingness to continue negotiations. By the 
District's own admission, Siegel insisted that the District 
at least execute a written commitment to relocate the line if 
the freeway off-ramp (projected for construction through the 
Tract) was located along a different route (R-144). Godfrey 
at some time prepared such a commitment (Exhibit P-6) but it 
was never executed, and it was never mailed, delivered or even 
shown to Siegel until months after the installation was complete 
(R-99, Siegel's testimony; R-144, Godfrey's testimony) and 
Siegel began to complain. 
Siegel testified that he imposed at least two con-
ditions as prerequisites to his granting an easement, and 
neither condition was ever met (R-96, 97). He was astonished 
and incensed that the District had made the installation 
without authority. 
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There is little question about the District's moti-
vation for taking a totalitarian attitude when Siegel was 
reluctant to grant an easement. It had entered into a contract 
with Hermes Associates (Exhibit P-8) under which it promised, 
for a $10,000.00 consideration, to "endeavor to have (the 
line) completed" to serve a Hermes shopping center "on or 
before August 1, 1976". The District was already three-and-
a-half months behind that schedule when it entered the Tract. 
Whatever its motivation, the District entered and occupied 
Siegel's land without right and without notice to Siegel. 
B. Procedural Facts. 
Despite Siegel's expression of concern about the 
District's tortious entry upon his property, the District 
failed to make any attempt to institute eminent domain pro-
ceedings. On August 22, 1977, Siegel filed his Complaint 
(R-2) seeking ejectment and damages. On November 9, 1977, 
almost three months later, the District filed the first pleadi~ 
of any kind in which a right of eminent domain was asserted 
(R, 6-12). That pleading, by center line description, des-
cribed the easement sought to be condemned. 
On December 30, 1977 Siegel filed his Reply in which 
he denied the District's power to condemn the easement, alleged 
that the line location sought to be condemned was not compatib~ ' 
with the greatest public good and the least private injury, 
and denied that the easement was needed, in the statutory 
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context, by the District. At no time did Siegel claim right 
to compensation for severance. 
On February 23, 1978, Siegel entered into an option 
agreement with Prowswood, Inc. contemplating the sale of the 
Tract but reserving all rights in his cause of action against 
the District if the sale was consummated (Exhibit P-2). On 
April 24, 1978, Siegel entered his consent to the taking of 
the easement subject to a determination of just compensation 
(R-47). On June 5, 1978, Prowswood's option having been exer-
cised, Siegel conveyed the Tract to Prowswood (Exhibit D-3). 
On June 4, 1980, after trial on April 2, Judge Sawaya 
entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
(R, 69-72). He ruled (1) that Siegel was entitled to no 
damages for the District's tortious entry upon and occupation 
of his land, (2) that the District had acquired by condem-
nation an easement in .33 acres of the Tract, (3) that the 
value of the .33 acres was $16,666.00 at the time of the take, 
(4) that the rights taken represented one-half the value of 
the .33 acres, (5) that the sewer installation had imparted 
a $4,000.00 value to the portions of the Tract not subjected 
to the easement, and (6) that Siegel was entitled to receive 
from the District, as just compensation for the take, one-half 
of $16,666.00, or $8,333.00, less the $4,000.00 enhancement. 
The judgment provided for no interest on the total award of 
$4,333.00. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Siegel asks this Court to remand the case to the 
District Court and direct that the Judgment be amended (1) to 
award $8,333.00 as just compensation for the take for the 
reason that the offset for enhancement is inconsistent with 
the applicable statutes, (2) to award Siegel interest on the 
amount of the award from November 19, 1976, at 8% per annum, 
and (3) to award at least nominal damages for trespass. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REDUCED THE CONDEM-
NATION AWARD BY THE AMOUNT OF BENEFIT TO SIEGEL'S 
REMAINING PROPERTY ATTRIBUTED BY THE COURT 
TO THE PRESENCE OF THE SEWER. 
Judge Sawaya's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
leave no question about the formula by which he calculated the 
award. He found the value of the .33 acre strip subjected 
to the easement to be $16,666.00. He found the easement to 
constitute one-half the value of the strip. He consequently 
found just compensation for the take to be $8,333.00. There 
is evidence in the record to support those findings, and Siegel 
cannot take effective exception to them. 
When the trial court granted the District an off set for 
enhancement to Siegel's remaining property attributed to the 
presence of the sewer, the Court acted without statutory 
authority and in disregard of explicit statutory direction. 
The statute which specifically addresses the assessment 
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of compensation in eminent domain cases is: 
78-34-10.* Compensation and damages--How assessed. 
Th~ court, jury or referee must hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties 
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain 
and assess: 
(1) the value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon appertain-
ing to the realty, and of each and every separate 
estate or interest therein; and if it consists of 
different parcels, the value of each parcel and 
of each estate or interest therein shall be sep-
arately assessed. 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
(3) If the property, though no part thereof 
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of 
the proposed improvement, the amount of such 
damages. 
(4) Separately, how much the portion not 
sought to be condemned, and each estate or 
interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, 
by the construction of the improvement proposed 
by the plaintiff. If the benefit shall be equal 
to the damages assessed under subdivision (2) of 
this section, the owner of the parcel shall be 
allowed no compensation except the value of the 
portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less 
than the damages so assessed, the former shall 
be deducted from the latter, and the remainder 
shall be the only damages allowed in addition to 
the value of the portion taken. 
(5) As far as practicable compensation must 
be assessed for each source of damages separately. 
Two separate elements of compensation are provided for: 1) 
compensation for the value of the property taken, and 2) additional 
*All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
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"severance damages" where the property taken constitutes a 
portion of a larger parcel owned by the condemnee. Under no 
circumstances may a condemnee be awarded less than the value 
of the property actually taken. Benefit to remaining land of 
the condemnee becomes significant only if severance damage is 
claimed. In that event, the enhancement value is deducted 
from the severance damage. Even if the benefit determined 
under subparagraph (4) is greater than the severance damage 
determined under subparagraph (2), however, the owner must 
still be awarded the "value of the portion taken". 
The statutory language leaves no room for conflicting 
views as to the legislative intent on this issue. Even if 
there were some ambiguity in the statute, there is none in 
this Court's pronouncements on the subject. The issue was last 
raised in Automotive Products Corp. v. Provo City, 502 P.2d 
568, 28 Ut.2d 358 (1972). In that case, Provo City constructed 
a street upon Automotive Products' land without condemnation 
relying on a right by implied dedication. The trial court 
found there had been no such dedication, and the city paid 
a stipulated value for the rights taken.* The city moved to 
reopen and adduce enhancement evidence. In a unanimous opinion, 
this Court stated: 
Inasmuch as no severance damages were 
awarded by the court, any benefits to the 
remaining property would have no appli-
cation. The rule that benefits can only 
be off set against severance damages is set 
forth in 78-34-10(2), (4), UCA, 1953. 
*In Autaroti ve Products, as in the case at bar, the rights taken 1q5: , were a mere easement, not a fee. The applicable statute is 78-34-2, UCA, 
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The doctrine of Automotive Products reflects the majority if 
not the universal judicial view (see City of Baldwin Park v. 
Stockus, 503 P.2d 1033, 105 Cal.Rptr. 325, 1972). 
Point II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTEREST 
FROM NOVEMBER 19, 1976, THE DATE THE DISTRICT 
TOOK ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY. 
The Judgment makes no provision at all for interest, 
and Siegel would be entitled to collect interest on the judg-
ment only from the date of its entry. Utah's eminent domain 
statutes are specific about a condemnee's right to interest 
from the date of actual taking of possession by the condemner 
or the order of occupancy, whichever is earlier. The relevant 
section is 78-34-9, which reads in pertinent part, as follows: 
... The rights of just compensation for the land 
so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties 
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall 
be ascertained and awarded as provided in 
section 78-34-10 and established by judgment 
therein, and the said judgment shall include, 
as part of the just compensation awarded, 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the 
amount finally awarded as the value of the 
property and damages, from the date of taking 
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or 
order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, •.. 
The statute further provides that interest shall not 
be allowed on so much of the award as shall have been paid 
into court. The District paid nothing to the Court before 
the Judgment was entered. In fact, the District made no 
appraisal of the property sought to be condemned, no deposit 
of money with the Court, and no effort to satisfy the 
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obligations imposed on condemning agencies by the section. 
There is absolutely no conflict in the evidence about 
the date of original entry and occupancy by the District. 
The evidence came entirely from the District because Siegel 
was not given notice and was not aware of the installation 
until months after its completion. The date was November 19, 
1976, and it is from that date that Siegel is entitled to 
interest on the award. 
Point III 
AN AWARD OF DAM_~GES FOR WRONGFUL 
ENTRY AND OCCUPATION IS APPROPRIATE 
Without question, the District's entry upon the Tract 
was unauthorized and tortious. A political entity presumably 
acts for the public good and without malice. In this case, 
however, the District displayed an arrogance and general dis-
regard of private property rights which call for some official 
rebuke. 
If agencies with power of condemnation are encouraged 
to ignore the eminent domain statutes and are assured they 
will suffer no disadvantage if they take private property 
without notice or ceremony, serious erosion of freedoms must 
result. Punitive damages are not awarded against political 
subdivisions, but it is entirely appropriate for the courts 
to award damages for trespass. 
Siegel adduced no evidence of actual damage except that 
he was obliged to institute the action which precipitated 
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the District's assertion of right to condemn. We submit, 
however, that the circumstances compel an award of at least 
nominal damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Siegel submits that the trial court has misread the 
statutes and has shown less than appropriate concern for 
the protection of rights which are constitutionally guaranteed 
to citizens in their confrontations with government. The 
relief Siegel seeks on this appeal is the minimum relief for 
which the circumstances call. The District's disdain for 
the state and federal constitutions as implemented by our 
eminent domain statutes should not be judicially condoned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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